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Abstract
Deep Neural Network (DNN) trained by the gradient descent method is known to
be vulnerable to maliciously perturbed adversarial input, aka. adversarial attack.
As one of the countermeasures against adversarial attack, increasing the model
capacity for DNN robustness enhancement was discussed and reported as an
effective approach by many recent works. In this work, we show that shrinking
the model size through proper weight pruning can even be helpful to improve the
DNN robustness under adversarial attack. For obtaining a simultaneously robust
and compact DNN model, we propose a multi-objective training method called
Robust Sparse Regularization (RSR), through the fusion of various regularization
techniques, including channel-wise noise injection, lasso weight penalty, and
adversarial training. We conduct extensive experiments across popular ResNet-20,
ResNet-18 and VGG-16 DNN architectures to demonstrate the effectiveness of
RSR against popular white-box (i.e., PGD and FGSM) and black-box attacks.
Thanks to RSR, 85% weight connections of ResNet-18 can be pruned while still
achieving 0.68% and 8.72% improvement in clean- and perturbed-data accuracy
respectively on CIFAR-10 dataset, in comparison to its PGD adversarial training
baseline.
1 Introduction
Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) have led to tremendous success in various applications, such as image
classification [18], speech recognition [17], medical applications [19] and etc. Wide deployment of
DNNs has raised several major security concerns [1, 3, 8]. For example, in the context of image
classification, an adversarial example is a carefully modified image that is visually imperceptible to
human eyes, but fools the DNN successfully [8]. Recently, there have been a cohort of works toward
developing new adversarial attack techniques, which have exposed the underlying vulnerability
of DNN [2, 25]. In order to counter adversarial attacks, several works have proposed different
techniques, such as training the network with adversarial samples [8, 25], regularization [16, 22] and
other various methods [27, 29].
In a separate yet related track, investigation towards generating efficient and compact networks have
also been accelerated. Many prior works have been conducted regarding compression techniques
including quantization [5, 6, 15, 39] and weight pruning [11, 26, 34]. It is shown that many DNNs
can function properly (no accuracy loss) even after significantly (>90%) network pruning [10, 26].
Such sparse DNN achieves significant speed-up and compression rate which opens the door for
DNN in memory and resource constraint applications [12]. Previously, several works have tried to
generate both sparse and robust networks [9, 37] by combining the network pruning (i.e. compactness)
technique to defend adversarial examples. However, their efforts either suffer from poor test data
accuracy or do not improve the robustness significantly.
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Figure 1: Weight distribution of ResNet-18 for the second convolution layer. We show three cases
sequentially 1) clean data training 2) adversarial training(PGD) and 3) RSR training. Observation
1: Adversarial trained network has less sparsity than clean training thus making network pruning
difficult. Observation 2: RSR training can achieve the desired sparseness with adversarial training.
Overview of RSR. In this work, we propose a multi-objective optimization mechanism that could
lead these two different yet related tracks, namely pursuit of network robustness and compression, to
merge. To achieve this objective, we propose a novel Robust Sparse Regularization (RSR) method
which integrates several regularization techniques to achieve such dual optimization. First, we
propose to train a DNN with channel-wise noise injection (CNI) embedded with adversarial training
to improve network robustness. Such technique injects a channel-wise Gaussian noise which is
trainable during adversarial training. CNI improves test accuracy for both clean and perturbed data.
Second, in order to simultaneously achieve network compactness and robustness, we propose a new
ensemble loss function including an L-1 weight penalty term (i.e. lasso). Lasso regularization during
adversarial training performs weight selection by constraining some weight values to a very small
values as shown in figure 1. When training is done, we could prune the small weight values based
on a threshold to achieve a sparse network. Our extensive experiments show that RSR training is an
effective network pruning scheme to achieve improved robustness without sacrificing any clean data
accuracy across different architectures.
2 Related Works
2.1 Adversarial Attack
Recent development of various powerful adversarial attack methods could totally fool a trained DNN
through maliciously perturbed input data. Adversarial attacks can be generally classified into two
major categories. First, white-box attack assumes the adversary has full access to the trained model
and its parameters. Second, black-box attack assumes the adversary treats the model as a black
box who could only access the inputs and output of the model. Now we briefly introduce various
white-box and black-box attack methods which will be studied in this work.
FGSM Attack. As one of the efficient attack method, fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) [31]
uses a single-step to generate adversarial example. If we consider a vector input x and target label t,
FGSM alters each element of x in the direction of its gradient w.r.t the loss ∂L/∂x. Similar as the
original paper [8], we define the generation of adversarial examples xˆ as:
xˆ = x+  · sgn(∇xL(g(x;θ), t)) (1)
Here, the perturbation constraint is . By varying the value of  we can vary the attack strength.
g(x;θ) calculates the output of DNN with parameters θ. sgn(·) is the sign function. To ensure valid
pixel range for the images we clip the value of xˆ such that xˆ ∈ [0, 1].
PGD Attack. Projected Gradient Descent (PGD) [25] is a powerful attack with multiple steps. It is
an iterative version of FGSM, xˆk=1 = x as the initialization. The perturbed data xˆ is updated during
multi-step iteration process. At k-th step it can be expressed as:
xˆk = ΠP(x)
(
xˆk−1 + a · sgn(∇xL(g(xˆk−1;θ), t))) (2)
where P(x) is the projection space and a is the step size. In [25], it is also claimed that PGD is a
universal adversary among all the first-order adversaries since it relies only on first-order information.
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Black-box Attacks In this work, we also evaluate our proposed method against a wide range of
Black-Box attacks. Specifically we investigate the transferable adversarial attack [24]. In transferable
adversarial attack, the adversarial example is generated from source model to attack another target
model. Both the source model and target model can be different but they are trained on the same
training dataset. Moreover, Zero-th Order Optimization (ZOO) attack [4] is also investigated in
this work. To perform ZOO attack it does not require training a substitute model, it can directly
approximate the gradient just based on the input data and output scores from the model.
2.2 Adversarial Defenses
Several works [8, 25] have proposed to jointly train the network with adversarial and clean samples,
called adversarial training, to achieve network robustness. Later, development of backward pass
differential attack (BPDA) [2] has exposed the underlying vulnerability of many other defense
methods relying on gradient obfuscation [7, 35]. Then, training the network with adversarial examples
has become one of the most popular defense approach to defend adversarial examples. Meanwhile,
there is a cohort of work investigating the effect of regularization techniques such as quantization
[22, 28] , noise injection [16, 20, 21, 23, 38] and pruning [7, 9, 36, 37] to improve the robustness.
Several previous works have investigated the effects of network pruning on robustness [9, 36, 37].
Recently, [37] proposed concurrent weight pruning and adversarial training to generate robust and
sparse network. However, their ADMM based pruning method’s performance on smaller network (i.e,
lesser width) suffers from poor test accuracy for both clean and adversarial data. Further, [9] showed
that pruned network will defend adversarial examples provided that the network is not over-sparsified.
3 Approach
In this section, we first introduce the proposed Robust Sparse Regularization (RSR) technique, which
is incorporated into a multi-objective optimization process that simultaneously improves network
robustness and compactness. Our proposed RSR mainly consists of two components: 1) a trainable
Channel-wise Noise Injection (CNI) and 2) lasso weight penalty (L-1 norm) for model pruning,
which will be introduced in this section.
3.1 Adversarial Training
Training the neural network with adversarial examples is a popular defense method [8, 25]. Since our
method integrates with such adversarial training, we briefly introduce it first. The goal of adversarial
training can be formalized as: if we have a set of inputs- x and target labels- t, adversarial training
tries to obtain the optimal solution of network parameters θ (i.e, weights, biases) for the following
min-max optimization problem:
arg min
θ
{
arg max
x′∈P(x)
L(g(xˆ;θ), t)} (3)
where the min-max optimization is composed of inner maximization and outer minimization problem.
For inner maximization we acquire the perturbed data xˆ as shown in the description of PGD attack
[25]. While the outer minimization is optimized through gradient descent method during network
training.
3.2 Channel-wise Noise Injection
The first regularization technique used in RSR is to inject learnable channel-wise noise on weights
during the DNN adversarial training process. Considering a convolution layer in DNN with 4-D
weight tensor W ∈ Rq×p×kh×kw, where q, p, kh, kw denotes number of output channel, input
channel, kernel height and kernel width respectively, the Channel-wise Noise Injection (CNI) can be
mathematically described as:
W˜ = fCNI(W ) = W +α× η; η ∼ N (0, σ2) (4)
where α ∈ Rq,1,1,1 is trainable noise scaling coefficient. η ∈ Rq×p×kh×kw is the noise tensor where
its elements are independently sampled from a Gaussian distributed source with zero mean and
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variance as σ2. Note that, σ2 is the variance of W that is statistically calculated in the run-time.
Preliminary work [16] shows that parametric noise injection is an improved variant of adversarial
training, where such trainable noise injection method could effectively regularize DNN during the
adversarial training. We follow similar optimization and update rule for α, but extending it into
channel-wise version, where weights for each output channel shares the same noise scaling coefficient
instead of whole layer.
We train the network with both clean and adversarial samples to achieve a good balance between
adversarial data and clean test data accuracy. Optimization problem of equation 3 can be solved by
minimizing the ensemble loss Lens in equation 5. The ensemble loss is basically the weighted sum of
losses for clean and adversarial data with channel-wise trainable noise injected on weights of DNN
model:
Lens = a · L(g(x; fCNI(θ)), t) + (1− a) · L(g(xˆ; fCNI(θ)), t) (5)
where a is the coefficient to balance the ensemble loss terms which is chosen as 0.5 by default.
Optimizing the loss function L improves network robustness. The optimizer tries to solve for both
model parameters θ and α to find an equilibrium between clean and perturbed data.
3.3 Lasso Weight Penalty
For incorporating the network pruning into the adversarial training, we propose to train the neural
network with lasso weight penalty. Lasso is known as least absolute shrinkage and selection operator
[32]. It was introduced as a L-1 regularizer that penalizes the features with higher values. Lasso is an
ideal choice for weight pruning as it shrinks the lesser important weights to zero [14, 33, 34]. We
include the lasso weight penalty term into Lens and reformat equation 5 as:
Lens = a · L(g(x; fCNI(θ)), t) + (1− a) · L(g(xˆ; fCNI(θ)), t) + λ ·
L∑
l=1
||W ||1 (6)
where Wl denotes the weight tensor of l-th layer, and L is the total number of parametric layers
(i.e., convolution and fully-connected layer). || · || is the absolute sum of all the elements of a tensor.
The effect of lasso weight penalty is determined by the coefficient λ, where λ in larger value would
generate a sparse model containing a significant amount of weight with near zero values. We tune λ
experimentally and describe the procedure for selecting optimized value of λ in section 4.2.
3.4 Weight Pruning
The proposed ensemble loss Lens serves the purpose of multi-objective loss function. We expect
a network after training with the ensemble loss to be more resilient to adversarial samples. At
the same time, due to the presence of lasso weight penalty, we expect a significant portion of the
weight tensor to converge to near zero values. We then perform weight pruning after training with
the proposed ensemble loss function, by setting the weights below a certain threshold (γ) to zero.
Note that, after pruning, we remove the noise injection term for zero-value weights. As a result,
during inference, we only add noise to the non-zero elements of the weight tensor. For the weight
tensor in a fully connected layer, lets assumeW = (ai,j)
n,m
i,j=1 (W ∈ Rm×n). For convolution layer,
W = (ai,j,k,l)
q,p,kh,kw
i,j,k,l=1 (W ∈ Rq×p×kh×kw). Then, the pruning operation can be described as:
FC layer −→ ai,j = 0 if |ai,j | < γ (7)
Conv. layer −→ ai,j,k,l = 0 if |ai,j,k,l| < γ (8)
Here γ is the threshold, which is the least absolute non-zero value in the weight tensor after pruning.
Again, we can tune the value of γ for different networks to achieve different sparsity ratio. Hence,
by tuning the value of γ, we can effectively show the maximum amount of parameters that can be
pruned without causing robustness degradation.
4
4 Experiments
4.1 Experiment setup
Datasets and network architectures. In this work, we only consider CIFAR-10 dataset for image
classification task as most of the baseline works report their robustness in terms of under-attack
accuracy on this dataset. CIFAR-10 is composed of 50K training samples and 10K test samples. Our
data augmentation method is same as described in [13]. Attacker can directly add noise to the natural
images as our data normalization layer is placed in front of the DNN as a non-trainable layer. We
adopt three classical networks, ResNet-20, ResNet-18 [13] and VGG-16 [30], to perform comparative
analysis. We also show the analysis on the effect of network width by varying the width of ResNet-18
network. We report the mean accuracy with 5 trials due to the presence of randomness in both CNI
and PGD [25]. We tune the hyper parameter λ to be 1e−5 for both ResNet-18 and VGG-16 and 5e−5
for ResNet-20.
Adversarial attacks. In order to attack CIFAR-10 dataset using PGD attack,  is set to 8/255, and
Nstep is set to 7. For FGSM, attack parameters (i.e, ) remain the same as PGD. We use the same
attack hyper parameters as in [25]. Moreover, we also conduct the RSR defense against several
state-of-the-art black-box attacks (i.e. ZOO [4] and transfer [24] attack) in order to evaluate the
proposed RSR against a wide range of attacks.
Competing methods for adversarial defense. In this work, PGD adversarial training [25] is
selected as the primary baseline method. Additionally, our work includes channel-wise noise
injection, so we also compare the method with parametric noise injection (PNI) [16]. Additionally,
we also compare our work with several network compression and pruning methods [22, 37]. Finally,
comparison with several state-of-the art regularization techniques serving as a adversarial defense
[20, 23] is also presented.
4.2 Results
White-Box Attack. Our simulation results on two popular white-box attack PGD [25] and FGSM
[8] are presented in table 1. During adversarial training, as stated in section 3.1, we use PGD
algorithm to generate the adversarial samples. First, for the regular models, we do not perform any
weight pruning. RSR helps to achieve significant robustness enhancement and even improves the
clean data accuracy compared to baseline PGD training [25]. We observe that, with increasing the
model capacity, network robustness increases as well. The observation of robustness enhancement
with increasing network capacity is consistent with previous works [16, 25]. For our proposed RSR,
the pattern remains the same. Our best accuracy was obtained using VGG-16 network. We could
improve the clean test data accuracy by 0.95% and perturbed data accuracy by 9.48% Under strong
PGD attack for VGG-16.
Table 1: Summary of CIFAR-10 Results: We report clean and perturbed-data(under PGD and
FGSM attack) accuracy (%) on CIFAR-10 test data. To visualize the effect of lasso and CNI, we also
report the independent test accuracy for both channel-wise noise injection (CNI) and lasso loss. We
report the percentage of weight being pruned (exactly equal to zero) as the sparsity(%). Capacity
denotes the number of trainable parameters in the network.
ResNet-20 ResNet-18 VGG-16
Capacity 269,722 11,173,962 138,357,544
Scheme Clean PGD FGSM Sparsity Clean PGD FGSM Sparsity Clean PGD FGSM Sparsity
Before Pruning
PGD 83.58 39.44 46.87 0 86.11 44.31 53.52 0 82.88 37.57 46.94 0
CNI 84.67 46.11 54.40 0 86.82 47.85 56.04 0 83.13 44.23 51.56 0
Lasso 83.56 38.69 45.78 0 85.92 46.94 55.2 0 83.26 41.93 50.33 0
RSR 84.96 47.95 56.72 0 86.95 52.94 60.89 0 83.83 47.05 54.05 0
After Pruning
PGD 51.58 12.49 16.11 60.47 70.31 31.00 35.8 85.43 78.40 32.14 42.21 50.62
CNI 55.93 23.91 29.11 60.74 50.97 22.54 25.31 85.27 75.79 40.39 46.37 50.62
Lasso 83.64 38.46 45.44 60.14 85.92 46.8 55.2 85.38 83.24 42.01 50.32 50.15
RSR 84.32 47.44 55.74 60.85 86.79 53.03 60.35 85.36 83.02 47.70 54.16 50.93
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Our proposed RSR can prune 60%, 85% and 50% of the network’s weight for ResNet-20, ResNet-18
and VGG-16, respectively, without any clean test accuracy loss. To show the comparative effect of
network robustness and sparsity, we prune each of the four training cases (PGD/ CNI/ Lasso/ RSR)
by equal amount. The level of sparsity can always be tuned by choosing different values of γ. As
expected, both PGD and CNI performance suffers significantly after pruning. On the contrary, RSR
outperforms baseline PGD (even without pruning) training method. We observe 8.72% and 6.83%
improvement on test accuracy under PGD and FGSM attack respectively for ResNet-18 architecture.
Again the most significant improvement observed in the VGG-16 network which has the largest
capacity. Such observation confirms that increasing the number of parameters increases the effect of
weight penalty and noise injection to enhance the network robustness. Another question to be asked
is what if we want to prune the network beyond the reported sparsity. For example, if we want to
prune ResNet-18 beyond 85% , does the network still remain robust? We try to answer this question
in the next paragraph where we explain the effect of network width with sparsity.
Effect of Network Width. [37] demonstrated that decreasing a network width may have negative
impact on robustness. To verify if our method also follows the same trend, we show an ablation study
on ResNet-18 with decreasing network width in table 2. Our observation confirms that RSR method
still remains more robust than the baseline PGD method for each case (i.e., w = 0.25× /0.5× /1×).
On the other side, we achieve less sparsity on network with smaller network width. Inw = 0.25× case,
we could only achieve 38.33% sparsity without sacrificing any clean or perturbed data accuracy. This
observation is quite intuitive as ResNet-18(0.25×) network already has 0.125× less parameters than
that of ResNet-18 (1×). Thus, even after performing less amount of weight pruning, the percentage
of parameter (7.7%) in the network would still be smaller compared to ResNet-18(1×) (14.37%).
Finally, such observation also answers the question asked previously: A particular architecture (e.g.,
ResNet-18) can be pruned up to a certain amount of sparsity levels based on the network width. The
maximum number of parameters which can be pruned without any sacrifice in robustness may vary
across different architectures. Figure 2a shows ResNet-20, ResNet-18 and VGG-16 test accuracy
under PGD attack starts to drop at different sparsity levels (% weight equal to zero). If any model is
sparsified beyond this point, it falls under the definition of over-sparsified model [9] and the network
no longer remains robust.
Table 2: Ablation study with varying width. We report clean and perturbed-data(under PGD and
FGSM attack) accuracy on CIFAR-10. ResNet-18(1×) is chosen as the baseline. Network width
w = 0.5× and w = 0.25× denotes that the width of the network’s both input channel and output
channel is scaled by 0.5× and 0.25× respectively.
Clean
Test (%)
Adversarial
Attack(PGD)
%
Sparsity:
(%)
(%) of parameter
remain in the network
compared to ResNet-18(1×)
Channel
Width
Adv.
Trained RSR
Adv.
Trained RSR
Adv.
Trained RSR RSR
w = 0.25× 82.68 83.18 39.01 45.38 0 38.33 −→(100-38.33)×0.125=7.7
w = 0.5× 84.99 84.85 43.33 50.7 0 63.17 −→(100-63.17)×0.25=9.21
w = 1× 86.82 86.79 47.85 53.03 0 85.36 −→(100-85.36)=14.37
Robustness improvement coming from Lasso training? or CNI training? or Both? We have
provided comprehensive experimental analysis on our proposed RSR method to show its performance
enhancement on three fronts: clean data accuracy, robustness (i.e. under attack accuracy) and sparsity.
Table 1, confirms that lasso loss primarily contributes to the sparse model generation through weight
shrinkage. However, in order to identify the chief contributor towards robustness improvement, an
ablation study is shown in table 1, where we also report effect of training the network only with lasso
loss and CNI, respectively. The regularization effect of lasso is less significant for ResNet-20 and CNI
plays the dominant role in network robustness improvement. However, both lasso and Channel-wise
noise injection contributes towards the improvement of robustness for redundant networks (i.e, VGG-
16). Both lasso and CNI can improve the network robustness by close to 4 % and 7 %, respectively,
on VGG-16. Nonetheless, we choose lasso because it helps shrink weight values to a very small
value, thus performing a robust model selection during adversarial training. Apart from that, lasso
regularization also supplements CNI towards defending adversarial examples .
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Choice of Lambda (λ). In figure 2b, we show a plot of test accuracy on both clean and perturbed
data versus Lambda(λ) for ResNet-20. Clearly, both the test accuracy starts to drop if we increase λ
beyond 5e−5. So for ResNet-20 we choose 5e−5 as the standard value of λ to achieve the maximum
sparsity without any degradation in test accuracy. Similarly, the value of λ for other architectures (i.e,
ResNet-18, VGG-16) is optimized experimentally.
(a) (b) (c)
Figure 2: a) The relationship between test accuracy (%) under PGD attack Vs Percentage of weight
pruned(exactly equal to zero). It shows each network can be pruned up to certain level of sparsity.
Pruning beyond that level would make the model over-sparsified [9] and the network no longer
remains robust. b) The plot shows both clean and perturbed data (PGD) accuracy (%) for ResNet-
20(RSR) VS Lambda(λ). λ is the regularization parameter for the lasso loss. c) X- axis contains
different Gamma(γ) values and Y-axis shows the percentage of weight below a certain threshold
Gamma(γ). γ is least absolute value after pruning in a network. Clean, Adv and RSR denotes clean
test data training method, adversarial training method and Our proposed RSR method respectively.
This plot is only for convolution layer of ResNet-18 architecture.
Black-Box Attack. We report the black-box attack accuracy for ResNet-20 architecture in table 3.
We test our defense method against un-targeted ZOO attack [4]. We randomly select 200 test samples
to calculate the attack success rate. Our proposed method defends ZOO attack better as it decreases
the attack success rate by 12 % compared to baseline PGD method.
Table 3: Black-Box attack summary. ZOO attack success rate (in 2nd column) is the percentage of
test sample being successfully classified to a wrong class by the attack. We report two sets of transfer
attack accuracy: one with VGG16 as the source (3rd column) and the other with ResNet-18 as the
source (4th column). For both PGD and RSR ResNet-20 is the target model.
Method ZOO Successrate (%)
Source(VGG-16)
Accuracy(%)
Source(ResNet-18)
Accuracy(%)
PGD 68.50 66.13 67.44
RSR 56.00 66.04 67.27
To perform transferable attack on RSR and PGD, we use VGG-16 and ResNet-18 network as the
source model. For both cases, our RSR performs on par with the PGD method. Additionally, our
proposed RSR reports higher test accuracy against black-box attack compared to white-box PGD
method. Better resistance against black-box attack is considered as a sign of a defense that does not
effectively uses obfuscated or masked gradient [2] as a defense tool.
Comparison to state-of-the art techniques. In table 4, we summarize the performance of our
defense in comparison to some other state-of-the-art defense techniques. Our proposed RSR method
outperforms these comparative defenses and achieves significant robustness improvement.
Note that, we compare with the unbroken defenses that are not reported to show signs of obfuscated
gradients [2] yet. Again there are some previous works on network pruning and robustness [7] which
might suffer from gradient obfuscation [2]. [9] first theoretically shows the effect of pruning on
non-linear DNN to demonstrate the vulnerability of over-sparsified model to adversarial attacks.
However, we are the first to formulate an improved adversarial defense with sparse regularization.
Our proposed RSR generates sparse and compact neural network that can achieve state-of-the-art
under-attack accuracy and much improved robustness.
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Table 4: We compare our method with three major categories of defense: a) Adversarial training
defenses: Projected Gradient Descent (PGD) training [25], Parametric Noise Injection (PNI) [16]
b) Compression or pruning techniques: Defensive Quantization (DQ) [22], Second Rethinking of
Network Pruning (SR) [37] and c) Regularization techniques: Differential Privacy (DP) [20] and
Robust Self Ensemble(RSE) [23].
Adversarial
Training Compression Regularization This work
PGD PNI DQ SR DP RSE RSR
Model ResNet-18 ResNet-20(4×) Wide ResNet ResNet-18 Wide ResNet ResNext ResNet-18
Clean(%) 86.11 87.7 87.0 81.83 87.0 87.5 86.79
PGD(%) 44.31 49.1 51.8 48.00 25.0 40.0 53.03
Sparsity (%) 0 0 (6×) Compression - 0 0 85.36
5 Analysis
RSR is performing regularization. Robust Sparse Regularization is performing regularization on
the network to enhance both robustness and compactness. It does not show any obvious signs of
gradient masking proposed in [2]. First, RSR performs better against single step attack (i.e, FGSM)
compared to multiple step attack (i.e., PGD). Also we report higher test accuracy against black-box
attack than white-box. Finally, increasing the attack strength linearly decreases the effectiveness
of our defense. Such observations confirm primarily our robustness enhancement is not achieved
through any gradient obfuscation or masking [2]. Instead, our improvement in robustness primarily
comes from regularized training method. However, after pruning , presence of noise in the surviving
weights is also playing a critical role. Table 5 summarizes the impact of the presence of noise during
the inference on robustness.
Table 5: We report the clean and perturbed data (PGD) test accuracy for two cases 1) with inference
noise and 2) without inference noise. We choose VGG-16 with 50 % sparsity.
With inference Noise Without Inference Noise Baseline(PGD)
Clean PGD Clean PGD Clean PGD
RSR 83.02 47.70 83.47 41.61 82.88 37.57
When we disable the inference noise in the network, test accuracy under PGD attack drops to 41.61 %.
This confirms the presence of inference noise contributing heavily towards the robustness. However,
our regularization training still stands out as even after the accuracy drop we maintain a higher
accuracy than the baseline. Thus we conclude the robustness achieved in this work can be viewed as
a combined effect of regularization(i.e., CNI and lasso), sparsity and inference noise.
Optimal Gamma provides the improvement on three fronts. We can fine-tune the model after
training to prune the weights of a network below a certain threshold (γ). During training apart from
enhancing robustness, RSR mainly shrinks the weights of the network. The demonstration of weight
shrinkage is presented in figure 2c. ResNet-18 network training with RSR contains 85% weights with
near zero value (less than 1e−5). So pruning weights with such small values will have minimal effect
on clean test accuracy and robustness. Thus, the value of γ can be tuned to an optimal point for each
network to achieve improvement on three fronts: clean data accuracy, robustness(i.e., under attack
accuracy) and sparsity.
6 Conclusion
We successfully co-optimize the objective of network robustness and compactness through our
proposed RSR training method. As a result, we show that heavily sparse network can resist adversarial
examples to generate both robust and compact neural network at the same time. Our proposed method
performs dual optimization during training to resist state-of-art white-box and black-box attacks
using a more compact network.
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